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HUMAN SYSTEMS INTEGRATION  
IN THE MILITARY
Michael Drillings, Beverly Knapp, and Nita Lewis Shattuck
Human systems integration (HSI) acknowledges that 
the human is a critical component in any complex 
system (Booher, 2003). It is an interdisciplinary 
approach that makes explicit the underlying trade-
offs among a set of technical domains, facilitating 
optimization of total system performance in both 
materiel and nonmateriel solutions to address the 
capability needs of organizations. HSI is deeply 
rooted in the military–industrial complex. Whether 
looking at HSI in the United States and Canada or at 
its British counterpart, human factors integration, 
one can trace the inception of this interdisciplinary 
field to governmental efforts to manage defense 
acquisitions more effectively. Many of the chapters 
in this handbook address HSI in the private sector, 
and it is evident that steady progress is being made 
to apply HSI in civilian and commercial contexts. 
However, the focus of this chapter is on how HSI  
is practiced in the U.S. military, particularly in the 
U.S. Army, and primarily in the context of the U.S. 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition life cycle. 
Here, we review the domains of HSI and HSI trade-
offs, illustrating how trade-offs are made using 
actual examples of HSI in action. We also describe 
how HSI is typically implemented at various stages 
of the DoD acquisition life cycle.
Like all interdisciplinary fields, HSI overlaps with 
other closely related specialties. HSI has much in 
common with human factors engineering (HFE) and 
systems engineering (SE). This chapter explores both 
the commonalities and differences among these disci-
plines, looking at examples of why other disciplines 
do not address HSI in the most effective manner.
WHY HSI?
The traditional defense acquisition process has 
failed to produce military systems that perform as 
advertised. One consequence is that in 2003 Con-
gress mandated that the DoD include HSI in its 
acquisition process, and this is reflected in DoD 
Instruction 5000.02 (DoD, 2008) and DoD Directive 
5000.01 (DoD, 2003). The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012b) also addresses the requirement that HSI be 
considered in defense acquisition. This congressio-
nal mandate has led to widespread debate about 
the definition of HSI and the number and composi-
tion of the technical domains encompassed by this 
interdisciplinary field. Also, the exact process by 
which HSI should be practiced has been unclear, 
adding some confusion about HSI’s primary princi-
ples and their application. Nonetheless, there is 
agreement that to achieve the best possible out-
come, HSI should be implemented at the earliest 
stages of an acquisition life cycle—or, as in the 
adage about voting in Chicago, it should be done 
“early and often.”
The opinions, analyses, and conclusions in this research are the authors’ own personal views. These views do not necessarily reflect the official  
opinions of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
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DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS 
AND GOALS OF HSI
The original goals for HSI, according to the congres-
sional language, were to manage life-cycle cost and 
to optimize system performance in military acquisi-
tions. Two major characteristics distinguish HSI 
from other related fields in accomplishing these 
goals. The first characteristic is a primary focus on 
making trade-offs among the technical HSI domains 
and the SE domains of cost, schedule, risk, and per-
formance. Trade-offs are made in every system and 
in every part of the acquisition life cycle. All too 
often, however, the effects of trade-offs that have 
been made are not evident until later in the system’s 
life—sometimes too late. For example, the decision 
to limit the size of a crew on a Navy warship, 
though seemingly a great cost-cutting move before a 
new ship is commissioned, may need to be reexam-
ined if results from the test and evaluation phase 
indicate that the workload is too high for the 
reduced crew to sustain the required level of perfor-
mance. If the ship has already been designed and 
built before a decision is made to increase the crew 
size, there may not be adequate berthing space, and 
crew members may be required to share berthing 
bunks or beds (called hot-racking because the bed, 
or “rack,” always remains warm). Habitability is 
negatively affected because the ship was not 
designed for the larger crew complement. Also, the 
food stores on this smaller ship may not support 
larger crews, so resupply may have to occur more 
frequently, increasing the cost of normal operations.
The second distinguishing characteristic of HSI is 
a persistent and continued consideration of nonma-
teriel as well as materiel solutions in any analysis of 
new capability alternatives. Although the final rec-
ommendation for an acquisition may be to procure a 
new system—that is, a materiel solution—HSI 
stresses the potential benefits that can be realized by 
leveraging nonmateriel concerns, such as manpower, 
personnel, and training. For example, the U.S. Air 
Force (USAF) required more missions be flown by 
remotely piloted aircraft to support the war efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, an HSI rec-
ommendation that was nonmateriel in nature. Sev-
eral alternative materiel solutions were explored, 
such as redesigning remotely piloted aircrafts so that 
a single operator could fly multiple aircraft simulta-
neously. However, the final decision was to quickly 
ramp up to meet the required capability by retrain-
ing qualified personnel, mostly pilots, who were 
already part of the USAF. Using personnel on hand 
until recruitment and training processes could begin 
to deliver personnel with the new skill sets was the 
original nonmateriel HSI recommendation.
These two characteristics of HSI differentiate it as 
a discipline from HFE and SE. Although HSI, HFE, 
and SE use many of the same tools, techniques, 
approaches, and methods, there are fundamental 
differences in their goals and rewards. A major goal 
of HFE is to improve human performance by mak-
ing tasks easier and less prone to error. Unlike HSI, 
in most HFE efforts, life-cycle cost or overall system 
performance may not be big drivers in defining the 
solution space of a problem. HFE professionals may 
not be well-versed in areas such as manpower, per-
sonnel, training, or life-cycle costs. In general, there 
are no built-in incentives for human factors engi-
neers to save money or to calculate life-cycle costs.
In contrast to HSI and HFE, a major goal for SE 
is the delivery of a system—on time and within bud-
get while managing risk. Systems engineers focus on 
materiel solutions that could include designing a 
new system or redesigning an existing one. Nonma-
teriel considerations—such as manpower, person-
nel, training, and HFE—may fall outside the realm 
of expertise of many systems engineers but are 
essential to the successful practice of HSI.
HSI faces some challenges in accomplishing its 
congressionally mandated goals. Contract require-
ments may specify system performance levels, but 
currently there may be few incentives for acquiring a 
system with reduced life-cycle costs. Life-cycle cost 
could be made a priority if it was a KPP in contracts, 
but that has not been done. A big question that 
remains is how to provide effective incentives for 
conducting HSI.
HSI IN PRACTICE: HSI DOMAINS
In military HSI, the focus is not only on the individ-
ual domains but also on what ties those domains 
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together and on understanding how trade-offs among 
the HSI domains occur and propagate through a sys-
tem. The practice of HSI involves understanding how 
to make those trade-offs explicit so that decision 
makers understand their implications.
Trade-Offs Among HSI Domains: The 
Interstitial Spaces
At the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), students 
are taught that HSI is a challenge because it dwells in 
the “interstitial spaces” among the HSI domains. HSI 
is the glue that holds the individual HSI domains 
together. The domains overlap, creating seams that 
require attention to maintain the integrity of the 
entire system. An assessment of the HSI domains 
must also include an assessment of the impact of the 
integration of the domains.
What exactly are these HSI domains, and what 
do they encompass? Table 3.1 lists the HSI domains 
that have been adopted by various governmental 
agencies. The left three columns of Table 3.1 list the 
domains that are specified in the Handbook of Human 
Systems Integration (Booher, 2003), those that are 
identified in DoD language, and those that are 
taught at the Naval Postgraduate School in the HSI 
graduate education program (Miller & Shattuck, 
2008). There are minor differences in the three lists, 
most notably the addition of Habitability to the 
Naval Postgraduate School list of domains. The four 
right-hand columns show how various branches of 
the U.S. and Canadian military forces address the 
domains of HSI. There is considerable agreement on 
the domains across the service branches, although 
there are minor wording differences, and Canada 
combines Personnel and Manpower into a single 
domain.
In assessing Table 3.1, there is clearly a great deal 
of agreement about the composition of major HSI 
domains. For example, each of the sources listed 
includes the six domains of Manpower, Personnel, 
Training, Human Factors, Safety, and Health Haz-
ards. Additionally, the various branches of the mili-
tary services have specific emphases in their domain 
lists. All three branches of the U.S. military add a 
seventh domain, Human (or Soldier) Survivability. 
The U.S. Navy and USAF add Habitability as an 
TABLE 3.1
Human Systems Integration (HSI) Domains for Various Groups
Handbook of HSI 
(Booher, 2003)
DoD Instruction 
5000.02 NPS U.S. Army U.S. Navy U.S. Air Force Canada
Manpower Manpower Manpower Manpower Manpower Manpower Personnel/
manpower
Personnel Personnel Personnel Personnel Personnel Personnel
Training Training Training Training Training Training Training











Habitability Habitability Habitability Habitability
System safety ESOH System safety System safety System safety System safety System safety




Note. The left three columns of Table 3.1 list the domains that are specified in Booher (2003), those that are identified 
in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) language, and those that are taught at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in the 
HSI graduate education program (Miller & Shattuck, 2008). There are minor differences in the three lists, most notably 
the addition of habitability to the NPS list of domains. The four right-hand columns show how various branches of the 
U.S. and Canadian military forces address the domains of HSI. There is considerable agreement on the domains across 
the service branches, although there are minor wording differences, and Canada combines Personnel and Manpower 
into a single domain. HFE = human factors engineering; ESOH = environment, safety, and occupational health.
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eighth domain, whereas the USAF adds Environ-
ment as its ninth domain.
Brief Definitions of HSI Domains
The following are brief descriptions of the domains 
of HSI as practiced by the service branches of the 
DoD. These definitions are shorter versions of those 
found in Enclosure 8 of the DoD Instruction 5000.02 
(DoD, 2008).
 ■ Manpower: The number of people needed to 
operate, maintain, train, and support a system; 
includes military, civilians, and contractors.
 ■ Personnel: The performance-related characteris-
tics of people needed to operate, maintain, and 
support the system. This includes the cognitive 
and physical capabilities required to train for, 
operate, maintain, and sustain materiel and infor-
mation systems.
 ■ Training: The process of designing and delivering a 
managed set of experiences so that people have the 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes that will enhance 
user capabilities, maintain skill proficiencies, and 
decrease individual and collective training costs.
 ■ Human Factors Engineering: The integration of 
human characteristics into system definition, 
design, development, and evaluation to provide 
for effective human–machine performance under 
operational conditions.
 ■ Survivability: Ability of personnel to exist and 
function during and following exposure to hos-
tile situations or environments; includes combat 
weapons-induced injuries, enemy or friendly 
casualties, hazards inherent to personnel dur-
ing threat or combat conditions, and inherent 
hazards of military equipment to include egress 
when system is damaged or destroyed.
 ■ Habitability: Those living and working condi-
tions that are necessary to sustain the morale, 
safety, health, and comfort of the user popula-
tion. These conditions directly contribute to 
personnel effectiveness and mission accomplish-
ment, and they often are related to recruitment 
and retention problems.
 ■ Safety: The design features and operating char-
acteristics of a system that serve to minimize the 
risk of illness, disability, or death to users, opera-
tors, and maintainers.
 ■ Health Hazards: Design features and operating 
characteristics of a system that create signifi-
cant risks of bodily injury or death. Prominent 
sources of health hazards include acoustics 
energy, chemical substances, biological sub-
stances, temperature extremes, radiation energy, 
oxygen deficiency, shock (not electrical), trauma, 
and vibration.
 ■ Environment (USAF only): Those system 
design characteristics that serve to minimize 
the impact of the system on the water, air, and 
land and the interrelationship that exists among 
water, air, land, and all living things. Prevalent 
issues include the prevention of pollution of the 
environment by reducing the use of hazardous 
materials and the release of pollutants into the 
environment.
Making HSI Trade-Offs Explicit
The HSI domains cover a tremendous breadth of 
information. The HSI professional, however, is not 
required to be expert in all of these individual 
domains. The effective practice of HSI requires 
leveraging the unique contributions of each of the 
HSI domains to arrive at viable recommendations 
from which decision makers can choose. Combina-
tions of these HSI domains and the additional fac-
tors of SE (cost, schedule, risk, and performance) 
form the solution space for an HSI problem. It is 
understood that trade-offs are made in every DoD 
acquisition program. However, trade-offs often are 
not recognized or explicit until after the system is 
fielded—or until a problem arises that limits system 
effectiveness. By applying HSI principles, multiple 
alternatives are explicitly considered at each deci-
sion point in the acquisition life cycle. The trade-
offs that are made are systematically identified, 
documented, and analyzed for potential impact so 
that they are considered before final recommenda-
tions are made.
Certain levels of system performance are 
achieved by trading among the various HSI and SE 
domains. For example, the cost of training operators 
of an aircraft has become prohibitively expensive. 
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Cost analysis of USAF pilots or U.S. Navy pilots 
shows that if more highly skilled personnel, such as 
civilians who already have a pilot’s license and flight 
experience, are recruited, less training will be 
required, and operators will reach training goals 
much faster. Before making this recommendation, 
however, HSI professionals must consider the cost 
of recruiting and retaining these more highly skilled 
individuals. Although less training results in an ini-
tial cost savings to the program, the recruiting and 
retention costs must also be factored into the equa-
tion before a final decision is reached. This example 
illustrates how the use of trade-offs between the HSI 
domains of personnel and training directly and 
importantly feed into decisions about cost, schedule, 
risk, and performance.
Throughout history, warfare has been associated 
with innovations and creative solutions—especially 
during periods of active military engagement—and 
this is still the case today. Emerging military threats 
require changes in conventional thinking, tactics, 
and equipment—and military acquisition and doc-
trine race to meet these challenges. An example of 
this process is the jet fighter aircraft. The earliest ver-
sions of the modern jet fighter first surfaced during 
World War II with the German Messerschmitt ME 
262. However, other countries quickly followed suit 
by developing and acquiring their own versions of jet 
fighters. The Korean War propelled these jet fighter 
aircraft to the forefront of the war effort as each 
nation sought air superiority. Since then, multiple 
generations of fighter aircraft have been developed 
and have moved through the DoD acquisition pipe-
line, with some efforts proceeding more smoothly 
than others.
In the current DoD environment, the Joint Capa-
bilities Integration and Development System process 
provides the formal mechanism to facilitate warfare 
innovations that are required to address emergent 
security threats. A recent example of this sort of 
warfare innovation can be seen in the mine-resistant 
ambush protected (MRAP) vehicle. During the early 
years of the second Gulf War, Iraqi and Afghani 
insurgents began targeting conventional U.S. mili-
tary vehicles with improvised explosive devices, 
causing hundreds of battlefield casualties. Military 
commanders requested up-armored vehicles that 
would help its passengers and crew withstand the 
detonations and explosive blasts of the devices. This 
request led to the rapid development and acquisition 
of the MRAP, designed specifically to address soldier 
survivability, one of the major HSI domains. As a 
result of the HSI lessons learned from the MRAP in 
the field, future generations of land combat vehicles 
should include design requirements for crew and 
passenger survivability.
HSI WITHIN THE ARMY
History
The MANPRINT (Manpower and Personnel Integra-
tion) program was established to implement HSI in 
the Army. That program was recently renamed 
Army HSI. When MANPRINT was established in 
1986, it was the first large-scale implementation of 
HSI. The foundation of the program was provided 
by General Maxwell Thurman, who commissioned 
the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral 
and Social Sciences to perform a study (Promisel, 
Hartel, Kaplan, Marcus, & Whittenburg, 1985). The 
researchers found that several major weapons sys-
tems would have been more effective if, during their 
development, their operators’ capabilities and limi-
tations had been considered.
Harold R. Booher, the first director of the HSI 
program, visited the various Army program execu-
tive offices and many of the key program managers 
to familiarize them with HSI. The visits were com-
plemented by a series of courses that taught HSI 
principles and analysis techniques. The effort to 
build acceptance of HSI was aided by establishing the 
HSI Army Regulation 602-2 (U.S. Department of the 
Army, 2001). This regulation gave the HSI director 
the responsibility to formally assess Army systems by 
considering the domains of HFE, manpower, person-
nel capability, training, health hazards, and system 
safety. Soldier survivability was added later as a sev-
enth domain. Each HSI assessment (HSIA) describes 
the adequacy of the developing system in meeting 
basic requirements in the domain areas and in evalu-
ating the risk assumed by domain trade-offs. There 
are no other assessments of these areas that are 
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considered holistically in the Army systems acquisi-
tion process.
Army Regulation 602-2 provided a solid basis for 
the implementation and management of the HSI 
technical mission. The HSI director was given a 
senior rank equivalent to that of a general. This level 
of seniority provided critical leverage to propagate 
HSI objectives across the Army.
HSI Today
Crucial to the HSI process was the development of an 
organizational structure for the application of HSI 
expertise that, as its core, incorporated technical pro-
fessionals of the Human Research and Engineering 
Directorate of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory. 
The Human Research and Engineering Directorate is 
responsible for the analysis of manpower, personnel 
capability, HFE, and training. Other agencies were 
identified to be responsible for safety, health hazards, 
and soldier survivability. It is the responsibility of the 
HSI director to compile the individual domain area 
reports into a single HSIA document that is used to 
make a recommendation to the Army acquisition 
decision makers.
The recommendations represent an assessment of 
risks to individuals and system performance, and 
they consist of GREEN, meaning “all is fine”;  
YELLOW, meaning the program is suitable as is but 
would benefit greatly from recommended HSI 
changes; and RED, meaning that this program should 
not be permitted to progress until these HSI prob-
lems are mitigated. RED ratings are discussed with 
program managers before they are assigned so that 
the program managers often will have time before the 
acquisition decision to formulate an effective 
response. The purpose of the HSIA is to motivate an 
effective mitigation of HSI problems, not to interfere 
with the planned progression of the system through 
the acquisition process. If there is no planned mitiga-
tion of the problem, the importance of the deficiency 
is discussed by the members of the Army acquisition 
decision board, which includes the HSI director.
The HSI director is a member of several senior-
level requirements and system acquisition approval 
boards. Through both the representation of HSI on 
high-level review boards and the formal HSIA, HSI 
considerations are always a part of the Army’s 
acquisition decision. The Army, at any one time, has 
several hundred major acquisition programs under 
way and several hundred additional minor programs. 
Though almost always performed on major systems, 
HSI analysis is somewhat less likely to appear in 
minor programs.
The Army’s HSI program is also supported by 
regulatory language in DoD Instruction 5000.02 
(DoD, 2008) and requirements from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Instruction 3170.01H (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2012a). These documents require the 
military services to establish and maintain an HSI 
program relevant to making acquisition decisions, 
but they do not describe the type of program or how 
its findings will be used in acquisition decisions.
THE APPLICATION OF HSI
The acquisition of major systems by the Army, and 
the DoD overall, is aptly described as complex. 
Major systems are developed over a span of many 
years because, as technology improves, require-
ments are refined, and lessons are learned from real-
world applications that change the system, often 
dramatically. The Patriot Air and Missile Defense 
System is an example of such a project. It started in 
the 1980s and is still undergoing substantial modifi-
cation. It was first conceived as a defense against 
piloted aircraft, but now it is also effective against 
missiles. Billions of dollars have been invested in the 
Patriot system, with even more investment planned 
for the future.
The complexity of military acquisition perhaps is 
most easily recognized in the requirements process. 
The requirements process begins with a capabilities-
based assessment (CBA; Joint Chiefs of Staff & Force 
Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate, 
2009) that is performed, in the Army, by the Train-
ing and Doctrine Command, which usually gets 
involved in response to an urgent operational need, 
issuance of new military strategy and Joint mission 
concepts, or periodic senior warfighter forum 
reviews (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012a). The CBA compares the new requirement 
with existing warfighting capabilities and requests 
that an analysis of the current threat environment  
be performed by the intelligence community.  
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These analyses determine whether existing capabili-
ties are sufficient for new requirements or whether 
capability gaps exist. The Army seeks to address 
capability gaps through a systematic evaluation of a 
solution space that considers various combinations 
of changes to doctrine, organization, training, mate-
riel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, 
and policy (DOTMLPF-P; Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2012a).
The DOTMLPF-P categories can also be com-
bined with the HSI domains to explore novel 
approaches for bridging gaps. The relationship 
between the DOTMLPF-P focus areas and HSI 
domains is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Although there 
is not a one-to-one correspondence among all catego-
ries, there is a strong relationship between the two 
approaches. There is also a strong relationship within 
the DOTMLPF-P and HSI categories, whereby deci-
sions made affecting one focus area or domain will 
have repercussions on all other categories.
The CBA team is directed to first pursue nonma-
teriel solutions before recommending a materiel 
solution. Materiel development implies either an 
engineering change to an existing system or the 
development and acquisition of a new system. If the 
decision is made to pursue a nonmateriel solution, 
traditional engineering approaches are, for the most 
part, avoided entirely, leaving the solution space to 
the HSI domains and the DOTMLPF-P categories. 
The acquisition process is driven by a set of require-
ments that are a result of both the identified capabil-
ity gaps and a more general consideration of 
required and desired capabilities.
The process of specifying requirements can be 
thought of as a delicate balance between many legiti-
mate but competing interests. For example, in the 
design of new armored vehicles, there may be a 
stated need for lethality, survivability, mobility, cost, 
size, crew capacity, maintainability, and, of course, 
usability. Note that many of these interests, but not 
all, are HSI related. Some participants in the require-
ments process will argue for a bigger gun on the 
vehicle, whereas others will want a smaller gun to 
reduce weight so as to permit more armor to protect 
the crew. Other arguments will be made by those 
seeking to reduce vehicle size, so that the vehicle can 
fit inside a cargo plane, or to minimize vehicle signa-
ture, so as to reduce its probability of detection by 
the enemy. The HSI community will analyze the 
requirements and their implications for system 
design from the perspective of each HSI domain. 
They will ask questions such as what size crew is 
needed to perform the required tasks?; what will the 
workload of the crew be?; will they safely fit into the 
vehicle?; and will they be able to exit the vehicle 
quickly, even if the vehicle has overturned? Given 
the constraints of design and funding, the Army must 
accept risk in some areas, so it is not surprising that 
certain HSI domains may be considered less impor-
tant than lethality or other requirements. Through-
out all of the discussions of system requirements, 
there is always the underlying thread that the true 
cost of a poor compromise may be other capabilities 
lost, lives needlessly sacrificed, and battles lost.
HSI THROUGH THE ACQUISITION  
LIFE CYCLE
HSI is important through all phases of acquisition 
but is most effective when it is applied at the earliest 
FIGURE 3.1. Relationship between doctrine, orga-
nization, training, materiel, leadership and education, 
personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) catego-
ries and human systems integration (HSI) domains. 
HFE = human factors engineering.
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stages of the acquisition life cycle (Booher, 2003; 
Hendrick, 2003). Design changes that occur later in 
the acquisition process become increasingly expen-
sive to implement (Graine, 1988). Most major DoD 
development programs follow the flow of major 
events described in Figure 3.2. In general, products 
are at different stages of maturity at the different 
milestones. For example, at Milestone A, the prod-
uct exists only in terms of the required capabilities 
and some initial ideas of what that product will look 
like. Moving to the right, at Milestone B, there is a 
plan that describes the product, but there may not 
be an actual prototype of the product. At Milestone 
C, a product already exists, and an acquisition deci-
sion board will decide whether the product is ready 
for initial low-rate production.
Pre-Milestone A
The value of HSI early in an acquisition can be 
immense. The decisions made as acquisition options 
are first explored will have a tremendous impact on 
the solutions that are chosen to supply a given capa-
bility. If the decision is made to proceed with a 
materiel (vs. nonmateriel) solution, HSI can ulti-
mately influence the design, cost, schedule, and per-
formance effectiveness of a system. According to 
Graine (1988), decisions made early in an acquisi-
tion life cycle have far more influence on total life-
cycle cost than decisions made later in development. 
The major contributor to system life-cycle cost is 
usually the cost of manpower required for both 
operations and maintenance. When system develop-
ment is just starting, acquisition decision makers 
should be aware of any significant differences in 
expected life-cycle costs associated with alternative 
concepts. The HSI community makes a powerful 
contribution to an acquisition by making this infor-
mation compelling and clear.
An important pre-Milestone A activity for HSI  
is participation in analysis of alternatives (AoA) 
studies to ensure that the human perspective is 
included in simulations and trade studies that the 
Army conducts to compare alternative capability 
concepts. For example, the Army may need an 
improved method for preventing attack from short-
range indirect munitions, such as artillery, mortars, 
and rockets. In this example, there are three major 
conceptual approaches to performing this operation. 
Incoming munitions can be shot down using a high-
firing-rate gun, attacked with a defensive missile, or 
attacked with a high-energy laser. The first two 
approaches currently are being used. The Army uses 
a variation of the Navy’s Phalanx gun, whereas the 
Israelis use the Iron Dome missile system for 
defense. Neither of these systems performs perfectly, 
so improvements to their performance (e.g., hit rate 
under differing conditions) or lower costs might be 
useful after trade-offs are considered. The purpose 
of the AoA is to compare alternative system concepts 
on several dimensions. An HSIA, as part of the AoA, 
FIGURE 3.2. U.S. Department of Defense acquisition life cycle. A defense need 
becomes a system by following a structured acquisition process, starting by conceptu-
alizing the needed capability, then following a solution path consisting of milestone 
decision reviews that authorize development, production, and deployment to the field. 
Adapted from DoD Instruction 5000.02: Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, by 
the U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, p. 12. In the public domain.
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would analyze the expected effects of the system 
concepts on HSI-associated issues, such as man-
power availability, soldier capabilities needed, 
potential safety concerns, and training implications. 
The laser-based solution might be the most chal-
lenging materiel solution, because there are cur-
rently only prototype high-power laser systems in 
the Army inventory. The Army has limited experi-
ence in operating and training such systems, so they 
may have to create a new enlisted career field if the 
required skills and training are significantly different 
than for existing systems. Moreover, there may be 
unique safety and health hazard concerns associated 
with such systems. Although none of these possibili-
ties necessarily make a laser system unacceptable, 
the HSI community should responsibly convey these 
concerns and potential consequences to the acquisi-
tion decision makers.
There are other examples of how the application 
of HSI early in system development contributes to 
the AoA. In one aviation system, there was a need  
to determine how many soldiers could fit into differ-
ent sized transport helicopters. Using a human physi-
cally based modeling program, HSI practitioners 
were able to determine the space required to accom-
modate soldiers with their standard combat loads in 
the troop compartment. Competing helicopter design 
alternatives were then compared with credible esti-
mates of their troop-carrying capacity. Another anal-
ysis of a planned armored fighting vehicle found that 
a three-soldier crew was required to perform the 
needed tasks. This determination has important con-
sequences for manpower, personnel, and human fac-
tors considerations. In a similar application, the 
workloads associated with different vendors’ enter-
prise resource planning logistics software systems 
were compared; results showed that a less expensive 
commercial product could effectively provide a 
higher level of performance and greater usability.
During the AoA, initial requirements and a pre-
liminary understanding of expected system perfor-
mance and functions are developed. At this stage, 
however, the requirements should not be overly 
constrained to ensure that there is room for differing 
competitive ideas for system design. Historically,  
the Army HSI community has had a limited role in 
recommending HSI-related requirements. A key 
reason is that funding for this activity has been 
absent. Recently, funding has changed, and some 
funds have been identified for HSI activities in sup-
port of Milestone A. This funding has allowed for 
insertion of such requirements as mandating user 
interface standards to ensure commonality across 
different platforms. Also, at this stage of acquisition 
the roles of humans and machines are considered, 
and some alternatives for allocation of functions 
have been generated in a number of recent acquisi-
tion programs.
The AoA and other HSI activities contribute to 
the development of the initial capabilities document, 
which represents the operational or “working” 
architecture for the system’s functional components 
(North Atlantic Treaty Organization & Research 
and Technology Organization Task Group, 2010).
Milestone A
Although not all system development has HSI 
involvement prior to Milestone A, all systems can still 
profit from significant HSI input after Milestone A. 
After Milestone A and during the phase leading up to 
Milestone B, the formal requirements of the system 
are validated, and preliminary design decisions are 
made. HSI engagement in the finalization of require-
ments is a key part of this phase because the require-
ments determined here lock in the operational and 
functional characteristics of the system. For example, 
a requirement for a gun might include that it have a 
range of x meters and a certain measurable effect on a 
target. Other requirements might specify accuracy 
and weight limits. These types of requirements are 
considered so important that they are called key per-
formance parameters (KPPs). Contracts are judged on 
the merits of the approach to meet KPPs; awards are 
made to contractors based, in part, on their ability to 
meet all KPPs for a given system.
Potential KPPs are nominated by different Army 
communities. For a weapons system, the warfighting 
community will define requirements, such as those 
described above for the gun. Other stakeholders will 
require sufficient reliability and maintainability. There 
may be demands for mobility of the system that relate 
to size, weight, and power. HSI issues are not usually 
KPPs, although there is often a training KPP. For 
example, a KPP might require that trained soldiers be 
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able to complete 90% of critical tasks on the first 
attempt. Training KPPs are not as measurable as firing 
range or vehicle speed, so measuring training effec-
tiveness remains an HSI challenge. There has been 
recent interest in defining a usability KPP. Usability 
may be easier to measure than training success, but 
meeting thresholds for usability is a function of sev-
eral factors: the effectiveness of the system design in 
simplifying the operation, the effectiveness of the 
training, and the aptitude of the soldier. It is difficult 
to attribute usability to a single factor for compliance.
Recently, a combination usability–training KPP 
has been proposed by HSI analysts. The idea is to 
demonstrate the feasibility of measuring the rela-
tionship between training and usability as an inverse 
function—that is, as usability design improves, 
training should become less intensive, lengthy, or 
subject to extensive practice. Although the function 
is likely not a straight line, the Army requirements 
and testing communities have agreed to work with 
HSI to investigate this concept using portable radios 
and handheld devices being developed for dis-
mounted troops (P. Savage-Knepshield, personal 
communication, May 13, 2013).
Although a training or usability KPP would be 
useful in furthering consideration of the HSI 
domains, the acquisition community usually seeks to 
minimize the number of KPPs. The more KPPs there 
are, the greater the cost of meeting those require-
ments and the less discretion that the system devel-
oper has in trading off capabilities. Also, keeping the 
number of KPPs to a minimum reduces the chance 
that a KPP will not be met. The assessment of the 
system’s success in meeting KPPs is critical to an 
affirmative milestone decision. KPPs are usually con-
sidered so fundamental that a failure on any of them 
leads to significant and difficult questions from the 
Army leadership, DoD oversight, and even Congress.
Milestone B
As the system approaches Milestone B, the form, fit, 
and function characteristics of the system become 
much clearer. For example, an armored personnel 
carrier program will have a reasonable estimate of the 
ultimate vehicle’s size and weight and the number of 
soldiers it will transport. There also will be an under-
standing of the crew’s tasks in operating the vehicle 
and responding to mission conditions. Even though 
information about the system is still limited, the pre-
Milestone B activities are a critical point during 
which HSI engages with the program office to 
develop an HSI management plan and working group 
to identify human-risk issues, design trade-offs, and 
mitigation strategies. This is the essential difference 
between early HSI work (i.e., pre-Milestone A) or 
support and a formal acquisition program. As shown 
in Figure 3.3, HSI effort evolves from an analytic, 
conceptual-process-oriented approach to a deliberate 
risk-identification and reduction-cycle procedure.
The HSI plan is implemented by addressing 
straightforward questions about such issues as
 ■ manpower and personnel capability. Will there 
be sufficient crew with sufficient skill to per-
form the required tasks under expected condi-
tions? For example, is the crew large enough, 
and does it have sufficient access to an outside 
view to know whether the enemy is approach-
ing? Will the crew be able to resupply its vehicle 
with heavy-weight ammunition in a reasonable 
amount of time without exhausting themselves?
 ■ human factors engineering. What information 
will have to be displayed for the crew? Will a dis-
play large enough to show and share that infor-
mation fit into the vehicle? Will the crew be able 
to egress quickly in an emergency? Will casual-
ties be able to be removed expeditiously?
 ■ health hazards. Will firing the weapons system 
produce noxious fumes? Will the vehicle be 
operable by the crew in very hot environments?
This is a partial list of the questions that must be 
asked, and the HSI working group is chartered to 
ask and answer them. Specifically, the group’s objec-
tive is to ensure that HSI risks are adequately 
addressed by identifying and tracking HSI issues, 
determining issue risk severity, conducting studies 
and analyses as required to inform risk definition, 
providing recommended positions to the system 
program manager and engineer, and ensuring that 
unresolved issues are brought to the program lead-
ership for resolution or acceptance.
Some issues will span more than a single HSI 
domain. For example, if a display is so large that it 
significantly hinders crew compartment egress  
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(a safety issue), there will have to be a human fac-
tors analysis of whether multiple displays could be 
used instead. If there is insufficient manpower to 
perform some tasks, a system component function 
may need to be redesigned. Safety issues often have 
HFE solutions, and many safety issues are also sol-
dier survivability or health hazards issues. Finally, 
there is often an ability to solve HSI problems with 
multiple alternative approaches. If what first appears 
to be a manpower issue is difficult to mitigate, per-
haps more skilled soldiers, better design, and 
improved training will resolve the problem.
HSI practitioners have a suite of tools they are 
trained to use. In the early stages of development, 
task analytic techniques are critical tools to HSI 
practitioners. A sound task analysis may serve mul-
tiple purposes. For example, a comprehensive task 
analysis may inform the human factors design for a 
system interface as well as helping with the man-
power estimate, the personnel descriptions, and the 
job assessment. Interested readers should consult 
Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) for a comprehensive 
description and explanation of the benefits of task 
analytic techniques.
For HSI to be effective, it is necessary to deter-
mine the influence of system design alternatives on 
soldier (or other user) performance as early as possi-
ble in an acquisition. Modeling and simulation tools 
often are used by the HSI practitioner. Some of the 
most frequently used modeling and simulation tools 
include the following:
 ■ the Improved Performance Research Integration 
Tool (Mitchell, 2012; U.S. Army Research Labo-
ratory & Alion Science and Technology, 2009a, 
2009b), a trade-off analysis tool used to help 
assess the interaction of operator and system 
performance. It is used to evaluate individual and 
crew workload, including maintenance hours. 
Primary outputs of the Improved Performance 
Research Integration Tool include task perfor-
mance time, task performance accuracy, and cog-
nitive workload (visual, auditory, etc.).
FIGURE 3.3. Human systems integration (HSI) activities related to the U.S. Department 
of Defense’s system acquisition life cycle evolution from conceptual process-oriented 
tasks to analytically based risk assessment. CBA = capabilities-based assessment;  
ICD = initial capabilities document; AoA = analysis of alternatives; MDD = material 
development decision; CDD = capability development document; CPD = capability pro-
duction document; O&S = operations and sustainment; T&E = test and evaluation.
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 ■ Command, Control, and Communications: Tech-
niques for the Reliable Assessment of Concept 
Execution (Kilduff, Swoboda, & Katz, 2006; Plott, 
2013; Swoboda & Plott, 2012), which is used to 
simulate communication and information-flow 
patterns to predict the information assimilation 
and processing load of system inputs on operator 
team capability and response suitability.
 ■ human figure modeling (Hicks, Durbin, &  
Kozycki, 2010; Kozycki, 2012; UGS Corpora-
tion, 2006), which is used to determine whether 
a given workspace design accommodates ingress, 
egress, seating, visibility, and reach.
 ■ the Crew Station Design Tool (Walters, Archer, & 
Pray, 2003), which supports visualizing and ana-
lyzing various workstation layouts. It provides 
such information as operator–component compat-
ibility, operator resource conflicts, frequency of 
use of each control or display element, and the 
optimal coordinates for the various components.
 ■ the Spatial Analysis and Link Tool (Sonalysts, 
2013), a computer-aided design software tool 
developed for the U.S. Navy to allow visualiza-
tion and analysis of the layout and arrangement 
of humans, the hardware with which they will 
interact, and the physical properties of a given 
workspace. It allows for modeling of spatial lay-
outs as well as analysis of visual and auditory 
communication patterns.
Using these and other tools, techniques, 
approaches, and models, the HSI practitioner is 
responsible for identifying problems that will affect 
system performance and quantifying the risk to mis-
sion success if those problems are not mitigated. This 
analysis includes framing the issues within a trade 
space. The trade space is the virtual whiteboard where 
multiple HSI issues interact and their relationships 
and consequences are apparent. HSI practitioners also 
identify solutions to mitigate or reduce risk. At this 
point, the program manager must decide whether a 
solution will be adopted or whether the assumed risk 
of not mitigating the problem is acceptable.
A visualization of the human–system design trade 
space is very useful in presenting HSI risks and miti-
gation options to program managers and systems 
engineers. The Army HSI community often uses dia-
grams to make the trade space more “hands on” and 
concrete. For example, Figure 3.4 contains a flow-
chart analyzer showing soldier performance risks and 
mitigation options for information displays for a mil-
itary operations center. The diagram shows how to 
FIGURE 3.4. Human systems integration trade space visualizer for risk identification 
and mitigation options (see text for details). Ops = operations; Ack = acknowledge.
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navigate the trade space in sequential steps: A ground 
operations center (Point 1) reacts to events and 
receives raw data for soldier and machine processing 
(Point 2); at times (Point 3), processing performance 
may not meet output demands (Point 4) due to infor-
mation overload, task complexity, decision time con-
straints, and so forth. When these processing issues 
persist, available mitigation or “how-to-fix” options 
(Point 5) include reducing information input, chang-
ing situation awareness and analytic tools, offloading 
tasks to others, or revising reporting and response 
requirements (Point 6). The solution space (Point 7) 
is reached by comparing option feasibility and cost to 
acceptable risk (dollar values for risk reduction 
options will vary with each system).
MILESTONE C AND BEYOND
An affirmative decision on Milestone C is a commit-
ment for the government to begin initial low-rate 
production and to deploy the system in operational 
environments consistent with the number of sys-
tems available. Government initiation of some rate 
of production often represents a major financial 
commitment, so the Milestone C decision, although 
not the end of the system development process, is a 
significant decision.
The activities performed between Milestones B 
and C during the development of a major system are 
not likely to resolve all outstanding issues. HSI anal-
yses based on system concept drawings or mock-ups 
of system components, by themselves, are unlikely 
to have identified all HSI problems that may arise. 
Closer to Milestone C, working with prototype 
equipment gives the HSI analysts an increased capa-
bility to identify HSI issues. Here, the HSI analyst 
will intensify work with the engineering design team 
on such activities as spending additional hours with 
equipment, studying realistic work scenario ses-
sions, and observing experienced users, often those 
who have field experience. This close teamwork 
builds trust and provides an opportunity to mitigate 
some design issues on the spot.
Each system is subjected to a test and evaluation 
process that often reveals unresolved or unantici-
pated problems, some of which are HSI related. For 
example, initial analysis of a display may have 
helped to determine the size needed for various 
icons. However, test and evaluation may reveal legi-
bility problems when the display is viewed under 
field conditions, perhaps caused by vibration or 
lighting conditions. Also, there may be last-minute 
changes to requirements that require modifications 
to design that subsequently result in unanticipated 
performance challenges. HSI analysis will again have 
to be applied to these design changes.
Because much of the system is already designed 
as it nears Milestone C, the cost of making changes 
here is much greater than if a problem had been mit-
igated earlier. Still, if the system is deployed without 
the mitigation, the cost to fix it after deployment 
becomes even greater.
THE VALUE OF HSI IN ACQUISITION
The Army and the DoD acknowledge that the HSI 
program has a long record of demonstrated suc-
cesses that have saved both lives and significant life-
cycle costs. Most program managers readily accept 
the requirement to have an HSI program and often 
are enthusiastic because HSI, through its analysis of 
soldier capabilities, significantly helps to improve 
system performance. Program managers are evalu-
ated on their ability to deliver systems that meet the 
stated requirements without exceeding costs and 
schedules. HSI analysis and assessment rarely cause 
significant delays in system development if the pro-
gram manager has adopted and maintained a dedi-
cated HSI team effort throughout the program life 
cycle. If HSI issues are addressed as part of the over-
all system engineering risk management process, the 
cost–benefit ratio for HSI is favorable. Therefore, the 
cost of maintaining an HSI program is miniscule 
compared to the total program cost. A recent Cana-
dian study on the cost and benefit of HSI showed a 
40:1 return on investment over the entire life cycle 
of a program (Greenley et al., 2008).
The return on investment for HSI is evident in 
the consideration of physical workload and health 
hazards. A recent HSI activity involved assessing 
injury claims of Army engineers who build bridges. 
Some of the tasks to build a bridge span over dry 
trenches involve two- and three-person lifting of 
heavy components for assembly. This task requires 
repetitive bending and lifting that often results in 
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acute and then chronic back injury. Since back 
injury benefits are a large cost driver in claims to the 
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the Army has 
been taking steps to reverse these types of physical 
injuries. HSI has helped by recommending simple 
lift tools and push carts and then computing medi-
cal costs if these or similar techniques are not used. 
The medical cost avoidance model (Bratt et al., 2010) 
has been a signature accomplishment of the Army’s 
health hazards and HFE components of HSI, since it 
shows emergent care and long-term disability costs 
that would be incurred if HSI design mitigations are 
not taken. The ratio of cost avoidance has been com-
puted as 70:1 (unmitigated cost to mitigated cost); 
this one simple HSI solution will save millions of 
dollars in veterans’ claims for retired soldier- 
engineers over a 20-year time span.
Given that HSI can provide great value, how 
influential is it in acquisition decisions? Acquisition 
decisions are complex and can depend on the per-
ceived need and urgency for system capability, espe-
cially during periods of conflict. It is difficult to 
describe the exact circumstances under which HSI 
findings will be persuasive. Most of the “red” recom-
mendations in HSIAs are acted on. Procurements of 
some systems have been terminated because of their 
failures to satisfy HSI requirements, whereas other 
systems have been significantly modified. Still other 
systems are not modified, but the conditions under 
which they are deployed are changed to reduce, 
though not eliminate, the identified risk.
During wartime, decisions on system acceptance 
and deployment are sometimes directly related to 
the specific needs of theater commanders. Com-
manders may be willing to accept HSI risks rather 
than not have the system, even if it is less than opti-
mal. Commanders and their soldiers often will 
employ a somewhat deficient system only under spe-
cial conditions or within environments that reduce 
the identified risk. For example, a recent HSIA iden-
tified a misleading fuel gauge in an aerial drone as a 
significant problem. Rather than not using the sys-
tem during the recent conflicts, crews adjusted their 
procedures to ensure a full fuel tank before take-off, 
kept careful track of how long the drone was flying, 
and made sure to land well before predictive models 
suggested the drone would run out of fuel. The fuel 
gauge problem remains, and there is a plan to fix it, 
but by using adaptive tactics, techniques, and proce-
dures, both HSI and military commanders were 
accommodated.
CASE STUDY
Consider the example of a submarine design pro-
gram. The HSI professional must immediately deter-
mine where the program lies within the military 
requirements and acquisition system life cycle. This 
determination will indicate which program activities 
have occurred, or may be underway, and what 
opportunities may be ahead. HSI professionals may 
have been involved with the generation and specifi-
cation of submarine requirements prior to this 
point. Because a materiel solution in the form of a 
new submarine program has been proposed, a pro-
gram manager would have already been designated 
to oversee the procurement, and the program is 
likely to be past Milestone A. Imagine that the pro-
gram has identified six HSI issues as important: dis-
plays and sensors, control of assets, physical 
environment, shiftwork, staffing, and personnel. 
The HSI professional would provide support either 
as a government HSI practitioner or as part of a 
defense industry contractor team. HSI typically 
would be located within either the program’s SE 
center or integrated logistics and supportability cost 
center. HSI is part of the program’s budget, so it will 
compete with other program needs for funding.
The HSI team should obtain from both the gov-
ernment and pertinent contractors any program and 
system engineering documents and data that specify 
the system vision and plans for realizing the vision. 
The HSI team also should pull “lessons learned,” 
task analyses, and models from legacy platforms. 
Then, the HSI team should create operator workflow 
concepts that can be represented visually with dia-
grams and descriptive models to illustrate the tasks 
that humans will perform, giving particular atten-
tion to the submarine’s crew and emerging hardware 
and software component designs.
This initial workflow representation becomes the 
reference point for all succeeding tasks and the 
source from which HSI issues relevant to the subma-
rine program can be generated. For example, will the 
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system’s command and staff structure be the same or 
different from current submarines in the inventory? 
What sensors and data streams will be associated with 
the system, and can these data be accommodated by 
displays in predecessor systems? Are new functions 
and tasks expected? Do personnel have the appropri-
ate skills to perform the expected tasks? Will the sub-
marine be taking on more varied and demanding 
missions than predecessor systems, and will the oper-
ational tempo be more intense? Workflow documents 
and diagrams will help address these questions.
In-depth discussions with system engineers, 
operator subject matter experts, and HSI experts 
would follow. Information from the first two 
tasks—HSI fact-finding and workflow representa-
tion and annotation—leads directly to the third task, 
which is creating an HSI plan to comprehensively 
specify how HSI will support the submarine design 
process by taking the individual HSI technical 
domains into account and supporting any trade-off 
decisions by the program manager. This plan is the 
critical tool for the management and execution of 
the HSI effort, because it details the sequence of 
activities and timetable for HSI activities and shows 
how these activities will be coordinated with the 
overall system master plan and schedule. It will 
expand the initial operational workflow into a time-
based task flow for all potential submariner roles. 
Then, role interactions will be assessed in low- to 
high-fidelity settings, starting with computer model-
ing and computer validation of workflow and auto-
mation concepts by experts. From this, trade studies 
and operational experiments can follow. Finally, 
demonstrations of system prototypes will be con-
ducted, followed by formal testing. HSI activities 
also would include development of appropriate met-
rics for each level of activity, oversight of data col-
lection, identification and resolution of issues in 
operator–system component compatibility and per-
formance outcomes, and periodic status reviews and 
reports to the chain of command.
FUTURE CHALLENGES
Military defense systems are becoming more complex. 
Tasks required to operate the equipment are more 
cognitively intense, information is arriving faster, and 
more systems are being networked into “systems of 
systems.” Increased autonomy and automation fur-
ther challenge human operators’ ability to intervene 
when systems degrade or fail. Moreover, these auton-
omous systems may degrade in ways that make their 
failure hard to discern and overcome. As technology 
improves, more and more functions and capabilities 
are placed within the same systems. We should not be 
surprised by the desire of users for more and more 
system capabilities, and we should not avoid the chal-
lenge of providing usability for these complex sys-
tems. Operators will always desire more capability 
from the systems they use. Providing these capabili-
ties in a usable form is a primary goal of HSI.
Each of these negative consequences of complexity 
can be managed by the application of HSI. Their solu-
tions, however, are likely to demonstrate the trade-
offs inherent in virtually all system acquisition 
projects. For example, increased data flow and input 
could subject an operator to excessive workload. HSI 
experts can identify the risk of data overload and eval-
uate alternative design concepts to include, perhaps, 
the use of additional automation. Increased system 
automation, however, moves the operator from direct 
control to supervisory control of the system. Teaching 
humans to exercise supervisory control requires a dif-
ferent type of training than that for direct control and 
may require more aptitude from personnel.
System designers and trainers may not be prepared 
to respond to these challenges even after they have 
been clearly identified by HSI practitioners. Within 
the Army, we are using this challenge to call for a 
renewed commitment to better system design, partic-
ularly regarding decisions required early in the system 
design process, and for the reconsideration of how we 
train, where we train, and the very nature of training.
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